Swiss popular initiative for a single health insurer… once again!  by De Pietro, Carlo & Crivelli, Luca
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The  article  describes  a  recent  Swiss  popular  initiative,  aiming  to replace  the current  system
of statutory  health  insurance  run by  61  competing  private  insurers  with  a new  system
run by a single  public  insurer.  Despite  the rejection  of the  initiative  by  62%  of  voters  in
late  September  2014,  the campaign  and  ballot  results  are  interesting  because  they  show
the importance  of  (effective)  public  communication  in  shaping  the  outcome  of  a popular
ballot.  The  relevance  of  the  Swiss  case  goes  beyond  the peculiarities  of  its  federalism  and
direct  democracy  and  might  be useful  for  other  countries  debating  the pros  and  cons  of
national unitary  health  insurance  systems  versus  models  using  multiple  insurers.
After  this  electoral  ballot,  the  project  to establish  a  public  sickness  fund  in  Switzerland
seems  deﬁnitely  stopped,  at least  for  the  next  decade.  Insurers,  who  opposed  the  initiative,
have  effectively  fed  the  “fear  of  change”  of  the  population  and have  stressed  the  good
outcomes  of  the  Swiss  healthcare  system.
However, the  political  pressure  favoured  by the popular  initiative  opened  a “windows  of
opportunity”  and led the  federal  Parliament  to pass  a stricter  regulation  of  health  insurers,
improving  in  this  way  the current  system.
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. Purpose of health policy
On September 28th 2014, Swiss voters rejected the citi-
ens’ initiative “For a public health insurance fund”, which
roposed replacing the 61 insurers that currently run the
ompulsory health insurance system with one single, pub-
ic health insurance fund.
Promoters of the initiative criticised several aspects of
he current system.
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Firstly, per capita health expenditure is high and in 2012
amounted to more than 6000 USD PPP, or over 11% of the
GDP. Secondly, in-patient care funding has a signiﬁcant
level of public participation (55% of DRG-based payments
to hospitals), but insurers and providers negotiate tar-
iffs on their own, without involving public authorities.
Thirdly, integration between healthcare providers is poor:
the system seems fragmented, with weak incentives for
cooperation or to develop prevention programmes [1].
Further criticisms raised against the current system
refer more speciﬁcally to the lack of transparency in
the insurance sector. A ﬁrst area of debate is the fact
that insurers simultaneously administer both the not-
for-proﬁt compulsory health insurance contracts, and
the for-proﬁt voluntary supplementary insurance policies,
making it difﬁcult for public authorities either to guarantee
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separation between the two areas of activity, or to avoid
making cross-subsidies between them. Another major
transparency-related problem arose in 2008, as citizens
and politicians discovered that health insurers, which have
to establish fully funded “community-rated” premiums in
each Canton, had in fact set premiums higher than the actu-
arial levels in some Cantons, while in others the premiums
were systematically lower. Since the actuarial reserves of
each insurer are managed at the national level, the popula-
tion of some Cantons ended up in paying over a decade
a fraction of health expenditure related to citizens liv-
ing in other Cantons. Although not explicitly illegal, this
practice of cross-subsidisation, which had lasted for years,
was strongly censured by the citizens and local politicians
of those Cantons that were paying too much, and became
a strong argument in favour of the initiative.
Finally, further criticisms highlighted the unhealthy
competition between health insurers (driven by cream
skimming), a major aspect of which is related to poor risk
adjustment, which has been based on a formula (deﬁned
in 1993) that has not been improved over the last two
decades [2]. Despite the reform of risk adjustment accepted
in 2007, but implemented only in 2012 [3], the 61 insur-
ers still compete in terms of selecting good risks instead
of improving services, and making extensive use of the
selective contracting tools available [4]. The gap between
the lowest and the highest premiums offered by different
insurers, for the same coverage, in the same region, can
therefore exceed 100%.1 Other efﬁciency arguments raised
by the promoters of the initiative mentioned the estimated
savings that would result from the following cost reduc-
tions: the abolition of marketing costs (190 million euro);
the elimination of the administration costs incurred by
people switching annually from one insurer to another
(80 million euro); the potential economies of scale related
to insurance system management; the major reduction in
the paperwork of healthcare professionals; and the esti-
mated 1.65 billion euro/year in savings arising from the
improved integration of prevention and of health care
delivery.
Countering these arguments, opponents of the initia-
tive speciﬁed several strengths of the Swiss health system.
Firstly, the Swiss are generally very healthy (life expectancy
is 83 years; 81% of people say that they are in good
health), and access to healthcare services is easy and timely.
Moreover, administrative costs amount to only 5% of total
mandatory insurance costs, so the only ways by which to
reduce health expenditure are: (1) reduce the prices and/or
quality of the insured services; (2) reduce the delivery of
unnecessary health care (improved control of moral haz-
ard); and (3) shrink the mandatory beneﬁt basket. Another
argument was  that many health systems with one sin-
gle insurer, or with a national health service, are facing
heavy debts and serious funding problems, while Swiss
insurers do not have any debt. Finally, several pro-market
arguments were used, arguing that: public services are
less efﬁcient than private ones, and tend to develop a
1 Premiums are available at http://www.priminfo.ch/praemien/
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bureaucratic mentality; the current possibility of switching
insurer represents a strong incentive to offer good services;
and the initiative would lead to a system with less – or no –
freedom to choose provider or to have direct access to this
provider.
2. Political and economic background
The Swiss health system is greatly appreciated by
patients and by the population as a whole. Moreover, direct
democracy, and the features of the Swiss political pro-
cess, make it very difﬁcult to implement major political
reforms in the healthcare sector [5]. This is conﬁrmed both
by the lengthy legislative processes inside Parliament, and
by popular ballots.
Despite these difﬁculties the healthcare and the health
insurance systems remain at the centre of political debate,
and are a recurring topic of citizens’ initiatives.
The main economic elements of the basic health insur-
ance system are [4,6]:
- Mandatory insurance reimbursements amount to less
than 40% of providers’ revenues; other payers are the
Federal and Cantonal government (35%), families out-of-
pocket (20%), and complementary insurance (5%);
- Insured parties choose both their insurer and the
deductible (ranging from 280 to 2337 euro/year2; no
deductible is the default-option for children); above the
deductible, there is a 10% co-payment, up to a maximum
of 654 euro/year (327 for children);
- Cantonal premium allowances subsidise the purchase of
mandatory health insurance by middle- and low-income
families (approximately 30% of the population receives a
full or partial subsidy).
3. Health policy process
Public regulation of health insurance in Switzerland
dates back to the beginning of the 20th century (the ﬁrst
organic federal law was approved in 1911 and imple-
mented in 1914). Insurance cover levels of the population
developed over time, reaching almost 100% before the 1994
approval of the new federal health insurance law, which
introduced mandatory insurance coverage at the federal
level by 1996. Since then, two  citizens’ initiatives have
already tried to replace the current system of multiple pri-
vate insurers:
- In 2003, 73% of voters rejected the citizens’ initiative
“Health at accessible prices” (which proposed a system of
public insurers, and a funding mechanism secured partly
by additional speciﬁc funds from Value Added Tax, and
partly by contributions paid by insured families on the
basis of their income and net wealth) [7];
- In 2007, 71% of voters rejected the citizens’ initiative
“For a single and social health insurer” (which proposed
replacing the private insurers with one public insurer,
and linking premiums to family payment capacity) [8].
2 Exchange rate used: 1 euro = 1.07 CHF.
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Fig. 1. Poll and ballot results, June 2013–September 2014.
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The 2003 and 2007 ballots highlighted the fact that
he Swiss fear greater public intervention in health insur-
nce, and that many voters oppose any further expansion
f income redistribution.
For this reason, the new initiative conﬁrmed the com-
unity rating premiums and the sizeable (and expensive)
ystem of public subsidies to families, but it abandoned the
dea – proposed in 2003 and 2007 – of premiums based on
amily income and wealth.
In the September 28th ballot campaign the initiative
as opposed by most political parties, and by most people
perating in the health system.
Supporters of the initiative included the Social Demo-
ratic Party (23% of lower house members in the Federal
arliament), some other minor parties (8%), most trade
nions and the Swiss Association of Nurses.
Those opposing the initiative included the Federal Gov-
rnment, the centre and conservative political parties (69%
f the lower house of Parliament), the health insurers, the
epresentative bodies of businesses, the Swiss Farmers’
ssociation, and the Association of Swiss Hospitals.
The Swiss Federation of Medical Doctors and the Associ-
tion of Family Doctors were divided, and they did not give
heir members any recommendations in terms of vote.
The campaign was powerfully dominated by the
pponents, who used simple messages in newspapers,
eriodicals, television, radio, and in the company maga-
ines that insurers send to their clients. There were two
ain messages: opposition to increased State intervention
n the healthcare sector (“public systems cost more than
rivate ones, and reduce the freedom of choice”), and the
isks associated with changing the system (“we know what
e lose, but we cannot even image what we would ﬁnd”).
According to Hirschman’s rhetoric of reaction [9], the
pponents’ campaign made substantial use of ideologi-
al slogans and images, threatening the “socialisation” or
nationalisation” of the health system, evoking “red traps”
nd an “enormous State administration system” that would
ecide about the peoples’ health. They also campaigned4: for SRF).
for “less State, more market!” by emphasising the general
virtues of free market competition, and also the “risk” of
becoming like France, Italy, or the United Kingdom, with
deﬁcits in health system funding, long waiting lists, and
alarming episodes of malpractice or poor organisation (an
example of this attitude was  the slogan: “I oppose the ini-
tiative because I do not want to ﬁnd myself in the same
condition as French, Italian or UK citizens. So I say no”).
Moreover, opponents stressed the prospect of a lengthy
transition period (described as a “no-man’s-land”), which
would introduce a great deal of uncertainty, continue for
many years, and be very expensive. The worry associated
with the idea of a non-reversible change was a major argu-
ment against the initiative.
The opponents’ campaign kicked off in 2013 and
strengthened in June 2014. Despite the absence of infor-
mation regarding the real costs of this campaign, its strong
and systematic presence in the media was  observed by all.
As a result, the percentage of those supporting the initiative
fell constantly over time (Fig. 1). This decline in supporters,
observed in the polls, shows that even the Swiss popula-
tion was  strongly inﬂuenced by cognitive biases, political
beliefs and the action of media [10], since a majority in
favour of the initiative (until June 2014) was  transformed
into a majority against it.
Conversely, promoters of the initiative were almost
invisible in the main media. With a meagre budget, they
began campaigning very late (mid-September 2014), and
with a rather low level of visibility. In addition to this,
promoters of the initiative failed to effectively counter the
most ideological criticisms made by the opponents.
The main message of the proponents was about cost
control, although cost savings estimates were almost
impossible to deﬁne, particularly in the long term. Due
to the conﬂicts of interest involved, the proponents also
criticised the ﬁnancial support given by health insurers to
the campaign, arguing that insurers should not use money
resulting from premium payments for purposes other than
to reimburse providers and administer insurance coverage.
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 rates) rFig. 2. Cantonal ballot results (rejection
4. Outcomes
1. The initiative was rejected by 62% of voters, with “yes”
voters amounting to 38%. The participation rate was
47%, which is fair for similar citizens’ initiatives. If we
consider the three ballots of 2003, 2007 and 2014, the
percentage of voters supporting greater regulation and
the establishment of a public health insurance fund
increased from 27% to 29% to 38%. Although not high
enough to win, this ﬁnal score is a remarkable result, if
we consider: (i) the excellent health of the Swiss pop-
ulation; (ii) the liberal values of the Country’s political
tradition; (iii) the good access to healthcare services,
with the entire population entitled to a broad bene-
ﬁt basket; (iv) the solidarity features of the mandatory
health insurance, such as community rating, open enrol-
ment, and a widespread system of premium allowances
subsidising middle- and low-income families; (v) the
high average income and wealth levels of Swiss citi-
zens, making it easier to accept high health insurance
premiums.
2. The affordability of per capita premiums was strongly
related to the ballot results in German-speaking Cantons
(Fig. 2; dotted line). In these Cantons, the lower-than-
average health insurance premiums were related to
higher rejection rates of the single health insurer citi-
zens’ initiative.
3. Fig. 2 also shows a clear “Röstigraben”, i.e. the divide
between the French-speaking Cantons (Genève, Jura,
Neuchatel, Vaud and, to a lesser extent, Fribourg), and
the German-speaking ones, with Ticino (TI; Italian-
speaking) lying in an intermediate position.
This “Röstigraben” was already seen in the 2007 ini-
tiative, which gained the majority of votes in Jura (JU;
58%) and Neuchatel (NE; 51%), followed by Genève and
Ticino (GE and TI; 46%), Vaud (VD; 45%), Fribourg (FR;
37%).elated to nominal premiums per capita.
4. For the ﬁrst time this third initiative caused a split in
the medical profession: the FMH  (Swiss Medical Associ-
ation) left its members free to support the initiative or to
oppose it. Several prominent doctors, and also a sizeable
committee of doctors, actively campaigned in favour of
the initiative. In the past ballots the FMH  had always
advocated maintaining the existing system of compet-
itive health insurance, and had consistently opposed
a higher degree of government intervention. This new
position can be partially explained by the abrasive con-
frontation between insurers and doctors in a 2012 ballot
about managed care, subsequently rejected by 76% of
voters, which was supported by the insurers but opposed
by a large majority of medical doctors [11].
5. A major consequence of the citizens’ initiative was the
sharp acceleration in the parliamentary process to pass
a new federal “law on the supervision of mandatory
health insurance”, which addresses several criticised
aspects of the current legislation. This reform started
in 2011, and in 2012 the Federal Government submit-
ted a report to Parliament, but subsequent debate was
very slow and insurers lobbied strongly against it (most
insurance companies have Members of Parliament on
their Boards). The “menace” represented by the initia-
tive pushed Parliament to pass the new law on health
insurance supervision as a way of dismantling the argu-
ments of those promoting the initiative. The law was
ﬁnally accepted on September 26th 2014, only 2 days
before the voting day for the citizens’ initiative, and
includes:
- New measures regarding the governance of insur-
ers (organisation, internal auditing systems, skills
required for the management, etc.);- Clearer division between the basic coverage and the
voluntary supplementary coverage offered by the
same insurer (ﬁnancial investments, attribution of
administrative costs, etc.);
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- New accounting criteria and rules for managing any
insolvency situation;
- A new process for setting basic insurance premiums:
insurers will propose premiums to a Federal supervi-
sion authority, which has the power to accept or reject
them, based on the alignment between the premium
revenues and costs for each year and in each Canton.
The Federal authority can also ask insurers to reim-
burse any parts of premiums that are set too high.
. Moreover, on March 21st 2014 Parliament accepted a
further risk adjustment improvement, adding new infor-
mation about the morbidity of the insured population to
the equalisation formula. This should partially improve
risk adjustment and further deter cream skimming.
. As a ﬁnal piece of legislation, on September 12th, just
16 days before the citizen’s initiative ballot, the Federal
Government adopted a law regulating the partial reim-
bursement (approximately 40% of the entire imbalance)
of insured communities who overpaid in the 1996–2013
period. As said above, in previous years the insured com-
munities of some Cantons paid premiums that were
higher than the actuarial levels, subsidising the insured
of other Cantons. Politicians and the general public found
out about these imbalances in 2008, arousing criticism
about the poor level of transparency in basic insurance
accounting systems. After much resistance on the part of
the beneﬁciary Cantons and the insurers, Parliamentary
debate on the issue began in 2011 and led to the decision
taken in September 2014.
. Conclusions
Following this new electoral ballot, the project to estab-
ish a public health insurance fund in Switzerland seems to
ave come to a halt, for the next decade at least. Insurers
ave effectively fuelled people’s “fear of change”, empha-
ising the good results achieved by the Swiss healthcare
ystem, the freedom to choose almost any medical facil-
ty or provider, the lack of waiting lists, etc. So the social
ealth insurance system established in 1996 is still in place,
espite the substantial differences between premiums, the
act that competition between insurers is still driven by
isk-selection, and the poor transparency of insurers.
The ballot defeat has also emboldened insurers: 11 days
fter the ballot, the main association of health insurers
Santésuisse) asked for the already-generous, tax-based
unding to be increased by extending the current 55% public
unding of DRG-based in-patient care payments also to the
ee-for-service based reimbursement of out-patient care.
uch a request would have been unimaginable prior to the
allot, when insurers were demanding more intervention
rom the markets and less from the State.
However, despite years of resistance to these reform
easures, the pressure exerted by the citizens’ initiative
as forced Parliament to implement much-needed changes
o the regulatory framework of the existing health insur-
nce system. Although the reform of the health insurance
egulation law can be considered as an attempt, by gov-
rnment and parliament, to block the much more radical
eform proposed by the citizens’ initiative, it is still a posi-
ive result for the promoters of the initiative.
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Our analysis of the citizens’ initiative, and of the ﬁnal
ballot’s outcome, shows clearly that direct democracy has
once again favoured the status quo, conﬁrming the insti-
tutional rigidity of the Swiss politics with respect to the
necessary health system reforms. However, the overall
status quo of the current health insurance system could
become a major obstacle to maintaining the ﬁnancial sus-
tainability of health care in Switzerland. In effect, rising
healthcare costs could imply a further increase to the
already substantial and expensive public allowances ear-
marked for low- and middle-income families, because the
current ﬁnancing model places a heavy burden on the mid-
dle class [12], and also because a large part of the population
has rather limited capacity in terms of affording further
premium increases. Moreover, the improved risk adjust-
ment and regulation may  be insufﬁcient to discourage risk
selection and to motivate the insurers to develop integrated
care programs for the sick population and in particular for
those with chronic conditions. Although more people are
switching between health insurers (from 2.0% in 2008 to
8.1% in 2014), and despite the diffusion of information tech-
nologies that make it easy to compare premiums and other
relevant information, the elderly and the sick continue to be
locked to their original health plans. Ultimately, this might
discourage health insurers from developing innovative care
options for their clients.
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